Not All Income is the Same to Everyone: Cognitive Ability and the House Money Effect in Public Goods Games by Hackinger, Julian
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Not All Income is the Same to Everyone:
Cognitive Ability and the House Money
Effect in Public Goods Games
Julian Hackinger
Technical University of Munich
19 April 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70836/
MPRA Paper No. 70836, posted 20 April 2016 04:42 UTC
Not All Income is the Same to Everyone:
Cognitive Ability and the House Money Effect
in Public Goods Games
Julian Hackinger∗
Technical University of Munich
19th April 2016
Abstract
The provision of public goods often suffers from a social dilemma
generating too little contributions. Yet, it remains an open question
how positive contributions materialise. Existing studies suggest that
individuals’ decisions on how much to contribute depend on cognit-
ive skills. Furthermore, mental accounting research indicates that the
source of income matters for economic decision making. I show experi-
mentally that subjects’ contributions in a one-shot linear public goods
game depend on an interplay of the two factors. While a house money
effect exists for subjects with low cognitive skills there is no such effect
for those with high cognitive skills. My findings have important im-
plications for taxation, redistribution, and voting behaviour, as well
as past and future experiments.
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1 Introduction
Due to their characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry, public goods
are peculiar to the economic world. The free-rider problem predicted by
classic economic theory causes the private provision of public goods to be
too low and inefficient outcomes. Yet, anecdotal evidence and experiments
in linear public goods games reveal positive contributions, albeit below the
social optimum. Although vital to know it remains an open question how
contributions materialise. Uncovering the main drivers of high contributions
might enable us to solve the social dilemma in certain situations and can
help us understand when co-operative outcomes evolve.1
In a classroom experiment, I find that subjects’ contributions to a linear
public good depend on an interplay of cognitive abilities and income origin.
I show that there exists a house money effect for subjects with low cognitive
skills while there is no such effect for those with high cognitive skills. More
precisely, when compared to individuals with high cognitive skills, those with
low cognitive skills invest more into the public good when their endowment
is windfall and less when it is earned.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview over
related literature and demonstrates my contribution by establishing respect-
ive hypotheses. Section 3 and 4 describe the experimental design and the
obtained results. 5 concludes and suggests implications.
1In 2005, the journal ”Science” published a list of 125 scientific problems that are
unanswered to date and are assumed to be drivers of basic scientific research over the next
quarter-century. The list of top 25 questions included the question ”How Did Cooperative
Behavior Evolve?” (Pennisi, 2005).
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2 Literature
Research on mental accounting suggests that subjects treat windfall money
differently than income they have earned. This is referred to as the house
money effect (Thaler, 1985). This should be taken into account by economists
who inter alia want to explain and predict economic behaviour. For this
reason, scholars have tested whether the effect exists in a number of economic
games. For dictator games in which a player can decide on how much to
donate to a recipient, the results provide concordant evidence. Here, subjects
show less generosity with earned income when compared to windfall income
(e.g. Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008),
and Reinstein and Riener (2012) for a more recent experiment). Furthermore,
Carlsson, He and Martinsson (2013) show that the effect is not merely an
artefact in lab experiments but persists even in the field (though to a lower
extent).
A similar pattern is observed in standard trust or investment games. In
these games an investor A decides on the amount of an endowment to transfer
to another subject, who receives a multiple thereof. Subsequently, B can
reward the trust displayed by A and return a share of the received transfer
back to the investor. Standard economic theory suggests that subject B will
return zero, retaining the entire transfer. As a rational individual, investor
A will take this into account and transfer zero in the first place. Along with
results obtained in dictator games, Houser and Xiao (2015) find that transfers
by both players are lower if they have to command over earned money. Since
pairs of participants were always in the same treatment (windfall or earned
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money), the effect, in particular for the returned transfer, could be a result
of peer effects as well.
However, due to or in spite of numerous attempts, corresponding evidence
in public goods games remains mixed (Spraggon and Oxoby, 2009). Cherry,
Kroll and Shogren (2005) find that contributions in public goods games are
independent of endowment origin. This is in line with results obtained by
Antinyan, Corazzini and Neururer (2015), as well as Clark (2002). In contrast
to these results, other scholars indicate that contributions are decreasing in
effort which hints at a house money effect. In a linear public goods game
in which subjects were uninformed about the heterogeneity regarding the
sources of endowment, Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009) find that individu-
als who have to exert more effort for a given endowment contribute less.
Furthermore, Dannenberg, Riechmann, Sturm and Vogt (2012) provide res-
ults for a house money effect on inequality aversion. In public goods games
with and without punishment their results indicate that windfall money re-
duces the aversion to disadvantageous inequality. Finally, Harrison (2007),
who re-analysed the data gathered by Clark (2002) by applying panel estima-
tion methods, shows that individuals have a higher propensity to free-ride in
linear public goods games if they play with windfall money. This behaviour
is at odds with the rationale that windfall money evokes perceived property
rights less strongly than earned money and is therefore spent more generously
(see Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996)).
To date however, the discussion has ignored a major factor indispensable
for explaining the house money effect. Research in various fields shows that
humans differ with respect to their cognitive abilities. The complexity of
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most economic problems requires analytical reasoning. As a result, cognit-
ive skills are one of the fundamental determinants of varying responses in
economic issues. Analysing a sample of more than 1,000 adults living in Ger-
many, (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde, 2010) show that cognitive ability
highly correlates with risk aversion. Since many economic decisions have un-
certain outcomes, it is likely that this disparity results in varying behaviour.
Ultimately, cognitive skills appear to matter in the particular case of pub-
lic goods games as well. Lohse (forthcoming) shows a positive link between
cognitive skills and contributions. Opposing results are obtained in a one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma game which is akin to the linear public goods game
(Kanazawa and Fontaine, 2013). The authors hypothesise that individuals
of greater intelligence have a better understanding of the game and therefore
recognise defection as the optimal strategy. Also pointing towards a negative
correlation, Nielsen, Tyran and Wengstro¨m (2014) find that free-riders score
significantly higher results in a cognitive reflection test.
Regarding the house money effect, cognitive ability appears to be partic-
ularly relevant. The concept of mental accounting proposes that individuals
categorise income in order to simplify economic decisions. This suggests that
individuals’ cognitive skills are associated with the extent to which they prac-
tice mental accounting and thus with related phenomena such as the house
money effect. An experiment conducted by Abeler and Marklein (forthcom-
ing) supports this prediction. By giving out non-distortive vouchers2 of equal
value for either an entire dinner (meal and beverages) or beverages only, they
2A voucher is non-distortive if its value is below the price of every possible consumption
good. Such a value only shifts the budget constraint towards a higher consumption level
and will not turn it like changing relative prices.
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find that individuals with lower cognitive skills have a higher propensity to
violate the fungibility of money. Receiving a voucher for drinks only, they
increase beverage consumption disproportionately.
Following this rationale, I argue that individuals differ in the degree to
which they exercise mental accounting. While subjects with low cognitive
skills need to simplify economic problems by applying mental accounting,
the opposite is true for subjects with high cognitive skills. Since mental ac-
counting constitutes the origin of the house money effect, one should observe
corresponding behaviour for individuals with low but less so for individuals
with high cognitive skills. Therefore, I hypothesise that subjects with low
cognitive skills contribute less the higher the share of earned income. For
contributions by individuals with high cognitive skills the origin of income
has little or no effect.
3 Experimental Design
To test my hypotheses I conducted a classroom experiment3 among first year
business administration students at the Technical University of Munich, Ger-
many.4 The experiment consisted of four parts: first, a heterogeneous real
effort task divided the subjects into three treatment groups. Subsequently,
the participants played a three person linear public goods game without any
3Experiments have shown that contributions in the public goods game increase when
anonymity decreases (e.g. Andreoni and Petrie (2004)). Since this paper aims to uncover
an interaction of the house money effect and cognitive skills, the overall level of contribu-
tions is less relevant. In fact, I assume that neither the house money effect nor cognitive
skills interact with behaviour subject to varying confidentiality. As all participants face
the same environment, I question any effects on the results presented here.
4Instructions translated to English are provided in the appendix.
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information regarding their opponents’ types or choices. In part three sub-
jects were required to complete a cognitive task that elicited their cognitive
abilities. Finally, I inquired about risk preferences5 and demographic inform-
ation (sex and age).
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants were randomly di-
vided into three treatment groups. Each group had to colour in a different
number out of a total of 150 circles. 67 subjects had to colour in 10 percent
(15 circles), which I will refer to as the low effort treatment. 39 subject
played in the medium effort treatment and had to colour in 50 percent (75
circles). 55 subjects had to colour in 90 percent (135 circles). This was the
high effort treatment.6 This task was used to simulate a real effort task that
is not cognitively demanding.7 In total, 161 students participated in the
experiment. Seven participants did not finish the task and were excluded
from the lottery draw which was used to pay out a fraction of participants. I
consider this proof for having successfully induced dis-utility of labour. The
respective subjects were also excluded from the econometric analysis. For
having coloured in all circles appropriately, all subjects received an endow-
ment of 100 tokens (10 tokens = 0.60 Euro). As the participants had to
colour in different fractions of circles, this induced different proportions of
5I used a question taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel which asks for a
subject’s general attitude towards risk. It allows respondents to indicate their willingness
to take risks on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating complete unwillingness to
take risks, and ten indicating complete willingness to take risks.
6As the main focus of the experiment was to compare behaviour in the extreme cases
of mainly windfall versus mainly earned money, I tried to collect more observations in the
low and high effort treatment. Nevertheless, the medium treatment was introduced in
order to achieve a better picture and was useful for robustness checks.
7I do not use GMAT questions or similar tasks since performance is likely to correlate
with cognitive skills.
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earned and endowed income (i.e. either 10, 50, or 90 percent of the total
income was earned). Subsequent to their task, individuals could decide on
which proportion of their endowment to invest in a one-shot three-person
linear public good with a marginal per capita return of 0.5. Therefore, the
pay-off function pii of player i with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} who contributes θi ∈ {0; 100}
is given by:
pii = (100− θi) + 0.5 ·
3∑
j=1
θj
with θj ∈ {0; 100} being the contribution of player j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Subjects
did not know the effort levels of the other two players. However, they knew
that all combinations of effort levels were possible.
In order to control for cognitive ability, subjects had to perform the cog-
nitive reflection test (CRT) as proposed by Frederick (2005). Although the
test only contains three questions, it significantly correlates with test results
from more sophisticated tests such as the Wonderlic Personnel Test or the
Wechsler Matrix Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011;
Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014). Due to the fact that the sample consists
of first year students who have not yet had many opportunities to participate
in experiments, I am confident that they were unfamiliar with the test and
preclude concerns raised by Toplak et al. (2014).8 I further want to cap-
ture effects related to gender and age, for which reason information on both
was asked from the students. With a share of almost 69 percent males, the
8After the experiment, many students expressed the wish to receive the correct answers
to the test. Even though the participants asked this during class, nobody guaranteed the
correctness of any of their answers. This affirmed my assumption that the participants
were not familiar with the questions.
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sample may seem biased. However, taking into account that only 33 percent
of all business students at the Technical University of Munich are female,
one can consider the sample to be random and thus representative for the
population at hand. One week after the experiment, 18 participants were
randomly chosen and assigned into groups of three to receive their final pay-
off. The pay-off was calculated by considering the contributions made by the
individuals, which had been drawn to form each group of three. Although
not every participant was paid, the prospect of receiving the pay-off with an
expected probability of about 10 percent provided a sufficient incentive to
act according to their true preferences (Dohmen et al., 2010).9 On average,
the selected students earned 7.68 Euro.
4 Results
As summarised in Table 1, subjects on average contributed around 51 percent
of their initial endowment.
The detailed distribution of contributions is illustrated in Figure 1. Note
that the plotted normal distribution function is calculated on the basis of
positive contributions only. This accounts for the intensive and extensive
margin of the decision problem at hand.
9Participants were told that about every tenth participant would be paid out. The
nature of the three-player public goods game required that only multiples of three could
be drawn. As a result, three participants were drawn in a session with 13, respectively
24 subjects and six participants were drawn in sessions consisting of 66, respectively 85
subjects.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median
Correct 154 2.013 1.016 2
Cognitive 154 .403 .492 0
Contribution 154 50.903 29.278 50
Risk 153* 5.418 2.002 6
Sex 154 .688 .465 1
Age 154 19.773 2.159 19
*One participant did not specify her risk preferences.
In the CRT, 40 percent had all three answers correct, followed by 32
percent with two, 16 percent with one and 12 percent with zero correct
answers (Table 2).
Table 2: Correct answers in the cognitive reflection test
Correct Answers Frequency Percent
0 18 11.69
1 24 15.58
2 50 32.47
3 62 40.26
Total 154 100.00
In line with Cherry et al. (2005), contributions do not differ significantly
across effort levels (55 percent in the low versus 48 percent in the high effort
treatment, p = 0.2302, Mann-Whitney-U test).10 Figure 2 illustrates that
the differences is not economically significant either.
More importantly, however, distinguishing between cognitive skills yields
another picture. For doing so I generate a dummy variable that divides
the sample into two subgroups: individuals with high and those with low
10The subjects in the medium treatment are excluded in the non-parametric tests.
This treatment was included in order to preclude a quadratic relationship. However, the
contributions of subjects in the medium treatment remain between those of subjects in
the high and low effort treatment, regardless of cognitive ability.
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Figure 1: Histogram of contributions
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cognitive skills. The CRT includes three questions; the dummy variable turns
1 if all questions are answered correctly and 0 otherwise. This separates the
sample into 40 percent high and 60 percent low cognitive types.11 Choosing
a lower cut-off would have generated subgroups that are too distinct in size.
Table 3 displays the number of observations per subgroup.
As depicted by Figure 3 I find that subjects’ contributions in a public
goods game depend on an interplay of cognitive abilities and endowment
source. When compared to individuals with high cognitive skills, those with
11Figure 5 in the Appendix demonstrates that individuals labelled as “high cognitive”
(all CRT questions correct) do not contribute significantly less than their counterparts
(p = 0.8259, Mann-Whitney-U test).
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Figure 2: Contributions by treatment group
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low cognitive skills invest significantly more into the public good when their
endowment is windfall and less when it is earned. To be more precise, con-
tributions by individuals with high cognitive skills do not differ significantly
by endowment source (48 percent in the low versus 55 percent in the high
effort treatment, p = 0.5775, Mann-Whitney-U test). These subjects do not
exhibit a house money effect whilst contributing 50 percent on average. Con-
trarily, contributions by individuals with low cognitive skills are significantly
higher in the low effort treatment (63 percent) than in the high effort treat-
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Table 3: Number of observations per treatment group and cognitive skills
Treatment Group
Cognitive Low Medium High Total
Low 30 29 33 92
High 35 9 18 62
Total 65 38 51 154
Table 4: OLS 1: Contributions to Public Good: Dummies for Treatment
Group (Low Effort as Reference), and cognitive skills
Contribution
Medium Effort -20.26∗∗∗ (-2.90)
High Effort -19.77∗∗∗ (-2.64)
Cognitive -9.813 (-1.47)
Medium Effort & Cognitive 16.80 (1.36)
High Effort & Cognitive 19.87∗ (1.91)
Age 0.782 (0.77)
Sex -4.387 (-0.91)
Risk 5.999∗∗∗ (5.36)
Constant 18.12 (0.81)
Session FE Yes
Observations 153
R2 0.235
Adjusted R2 0.175
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ment (44 percent, p = 0.0157, Mann-Whitney-U test). Thus, these subjects
exhibit the house money effect.12
The results are robust to controlling for session fixed effects, sex, age,
and risk preferences in OLS regressions with cognitive ability as a dummy
(Table 4) and as a continuous variable (Correct) that indicates the number
of correctly answered CRT questions (Table 5 in the Appendix).
12Analogue t-tests deliver the same results.
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Figure 3: Contributions by cognitive type and treatment group (Figure 6 in
the Appendix displays corresponding boxplots)
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Calculating the contributions by individuals with high and low cognitive
abilities in the high and low effort treatment while keeping the control vari-
ables from OLS 1 at their means gives a similar pattern as the non-parametric
analysis. This is captured by Figure 4, which serves as a graphical illustration
for the underlying effect. For individuals with high cognitive skills the slope
is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.851, t-test). This indicates that
the propensity to co-operate for those individuals is independent of whether
they exert effort for the money they decide upon or not. The opposite is true
for individuals with low cognitive skills. They give less the more they have to
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Figure 4: OLS 1: Contributions by cognitive type and treatment group (low
and high)
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Note: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
work for their endowment. This is depicted by a significantly negative slope
(p = 0.006, t-test).
Interestingly, the two graphs intersect roughly in the middle of both ex-
tremes. This means that in a situation in which income consists of half wind-
fall and half earned money, individuals with high and low cognitive skills are
comparably co-operative.
In addition to these results, I observe a negative but non-significant effect
of cognitive skills on co-operative behaviour.13 Hence, in contrast to Lohse
(forthcoming) I argue that individuals with lower cognitive skills are not less
13See Figure 5 for the respective mean contributions.
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generous or co-operative per se. It depends on the origin of their endowment.
Furthermore, risk seeking preferences foster high contributions to the public
good.
One can argue that a subject’s choice on whether and how much to con-
tribute are two distinct decision problems (Harrison, 2007). However, separ-
ating zero contributions and positive contributions does not affect the results
(see Table 6 and Figure 7 in the Appendix). Regarding the extensive margin,
I only find significant effects for gender and risk preferences. Male subjects
are less likely to contribute, while risk seeking subjects do so with a higher
probability. However, neither cognitive ability nor the source of income have
a significant effect on contribution behaviour.
5 Conclusion
Public goods games have always received high levels of attention in social
science. Especially during the last decades, experimental studies have fre-
quently tried to shed light on the dynamics behind co-operative behaviour.
For instance, researchers want to understand when co-operation arises and
how it evolves when the game is played repeatedly. Nevertheless, existing
research primarily reveals which games induce high contributions and which
do not (see Zelmer (2003) for on overview on public goods games). However,
many real life settings do not allow for adjustments of the “game” that is
played. Instead, it would be helpful to know who will co-operate and who
will not. If we knew who to rely on, we could concentrate on convincing indi-
viduals that are more reluctant to co-operate and thereby increase efficiency.
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Furthermore, if we know that behaviour is more sensitive to endowment ori-
gin for some than for others, governments can target policies more precisely.
Both tasks, however, require information on individual preferences and be-
haviour in various settings.
This is the first paper to show that contributions to a linear public good
depend on an interplay of income origin and cognitive skills. Contributions
to a public goods game can be regarded as subjects’ revealed preferences in
favour of the public good in question or her cooperativeness. If the com-
position and the source of income have an influence on preferences, policy
makers should consider the impact of a changing composition of income in
decisions on taxation and redistribution. Policies that increase the share of
earned money could shift preferences towards less demand and support for
public goods for a certain subgroup of the population. In addition, my find-
ings can help to explain voting behaviour as a means to express preferences
(e.g. the approval of publicly financed large-scale projects). The described
dynamics could in turn be exploited in order to implement policies that need
the population’s support.
Finally, the results have far-reaching implications for past and future
experiments. In economics the participant pool often consists solely of uni-
versity students. There is no doubt that these subjects have above average
cognitive skills. Nevertheless, I am able to identify an interaction effect
within this group. For a population that includes individuals with lower cog-
nitive skills the interaction effect will be even more pronounced. Hence, this
severely limits the external validity of experimental findings which could be
affected by the house money effect.
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The results are particularly relevant for public goods games due to the
inefficiencies we observe in this regard. However, it may also be of interest
whether an interaction of the house money effect and cognitive skills occurs
in other economic games.
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Subject ID: 300 
 
Experiment – Instructions 
Dear participant, 
to begin with, I would like to thank you for partaking in this experiment. 
For this experiment, we do not use Euro as our currency, but ECU (Experimental Currency Units) instead. Upon 
completion of the experiment, the ECUs you have earned will be converted to Euro. The exchange rate equals  
10 ECU = 0.60€. After the experiment ends, randomly selected students will receive the payoff they have obtained. 
This experiment consists of two parts: the first requires you to fulfil a task, in the second you will be asked to invest 
ECUs. 
 
Part 1: Task 
To complete part one of the experiment, 10 rows of circles must be filled in while either 1, 5 or 9 rows have already 
been filled in. For completing this task you receive an initial endowment of 100 ECU. To participate in the draw, 
determining which students receive monetary payoffs, all rows must be filled in. 
 
Part 2: Investment 
In part two you anonymously play an economic game with two other participants. The amount of rows these 
participants had to fill in was randomly determined. 
This game provides you with the option to invest a share of your initial endowment. The investment of all three group 
members is added up, then multiplied by 1.5 and subsequently split evenly among all three group members. 
The share of your initial endowment you chose not to invest, goes directly towards your balance at the end of a round. 
 Payoff = (Initial endowment – Investment) + 1/3 * (1.5 * Sum of investments) 
Example: 
Of her 100 ECU initial endowment, a participant (group member 1) decides to keep 20 ECU and invest 80 ECU. The 
two other group members decide to invest 40 ECU (group member 2) and 60 ECU (group member 3), respectively. In 
total, 80 ECU + 40 ECU + 60 ECU = 180 ECU were invested. Multiplied by 1.5, this amounts to 270 ECU, which is then 
divided evenly among all group members (90 ECU per person). As a result, the individual group members receive the 
following payoffs: 
 Group member 1 keeps the 20 ECU she did not invest and receives an additional 90 ECU from the 
investment, a total of 110 ECU. 
 Group member 2: 60 ECU (= 100 ECU – 40 ECU) + 90 ECU (Investment) = 150 ECU.  
 Group member 3: 40 ECU (= 100 ECU – 60 ECU) + 90 ECU (Investment) = 130 ECU. 
 
Payoff 
Following this experiment, all task and decision sheets will be collected. For this reason, please detach this sheet 
from the second one. After the collection of the sheets, the winners will immediately and anonymously be 
determined. These individuals’ responses will be used to calculate their respective payoffs. In the case of an 
incomplete response sheet, the draw will be repeated. The winners will be able to receive their payoffs at my office 
(2423) after presenting their title sheet and subject id/participant number, which can be found at the end of all 
sheets.  
Appendix
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Subject ID: 300 
 
Task sheet 
 
Please fill in all empty circles with a ballpoint pen. 
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Subject ID: 300 
 
Decision sheet 
 
Investment decision 
 
What amount would you like to invest? 
Please choose a number between 0 and 100. Note that any amount of this endowment, which you choose not to 
invest is counted directly towards your payoff. 
 
Additional Questions 
1. A bat and a ball together cost 110 cents. The bat costs 100 cents more than 
the ball. How much does the ball cost? (in Euro) 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? (in minutes) 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take 
for the patch to cover half of the lake? (in days) 
Risk preferences: 
Assess yourself: Are you more of a risk-taking person or do you think of yourself as a risk-avoider? Please tick a box 
on the scale below, 0 indicating “no tolerance for risk” and 10 indicating “very risk-seeking”. The values in between 
can help you more finely represent your image of yourself. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Demographic Information 
In closing, I would like to ask you to give some information on yourself. It is important for analysing the data created 
in this experiment and will be treated strictly confidentially. 
 
Your gender:    Female 
     Male 
 
Your age: 
 
Your final math grade: 
 
 
 
Euro 
Minutes 
ECU 
Days 
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Figure 5: Contributions by cognitive skills
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Table 5: OLS 2: Contributions to Public Good: Dummies for Treatment
Group (Low Effort as Reference), number of correct answers in the CRT as
continuous variable
Contribution
Medium Effort -25.55∗∗ (-2.06)
High Effort -31.73∗∗∗ (-2.64)
Correct -5.706 (-1.60)
Medium Effort × Correct 5.317 (0.94)
High Effort × Correct 9.771∗ (1.94)
Age 0.774 (0.76)
Sex -3.181 (-0.66)
Risk 6.052∗∗∗ (5.45)
Constant 24.51 (1.03)
Session FE Yes
Observations 153
R2 0.234
Adjusted R2 0.174
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Results for only positive contributions versus all contributions
Positive contributions All contributions
Medium Effort -14.13∗∗ (-2.27) -20.26∗∗∗ (-2.90)
High Effort -20.12∗∗∗ (-2.98) -19.77∗∗∗ (-2.64)
Cognitive -7.194 (-1.20) -9.813 (-1.47)
Medium Effort & Cognitive 11.46 (1.02) 16.80 (1.36)
High Effort & Cognitive 22.66∗∗ (2.37) 19.87∗ (1.91)
Age 0.787 (0.85) 0.782 (0.77)
Sex 2.108 (0.49) -4.387 (-0.91)
Risk 4.554∗∗∗ (4.34) 5.999∗∗∗ (5.36)
Constant 23.15 (1.16) 18.12 (0.81)
Session FE Yes Yes
Observations 138 153
R2 0.228 0.235
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.175
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 7: Two part model: Positive contributions by cognitive type and
treatment group (low and high)
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Note: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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